The International Maritime Bureau has studied maritime piracy and has noted substantial increases in acts of piracy from 2006 through 2011. While 2012 has exhibited a decrease in the number of acts, the risks and costs remain intolerable and a satisfactory solution remains elusive. The cost of piracy in terms of goods stolen, insurance premiums, freight re-routings, security teams, ship damage and other factors is difficult to measure exactly. However, the International Maritime Bureau estimated that Somali piracy cost the world $7 billion in 2011.
Ransom demands pose both a threat to human life and a direct and expensive cost. According to International Maritime Bureau, the number of incidents in 2012 was down 32 percent through July 2012 compared to 2011. Reuters reported that pirates are exhibiting higher levels of organization. Reuters obtained a “pirate packet” that was presented to an owner of a hijacked oil tanker from a criminal organization naming itself the Pirate Action Group. The packet included a form memo with demands for compensation to obtain return of vessel and crew. According to Reuters, as of early August 2012, armed Somali pirates hold more than 170 hostages, according to the IMB, and were responsible for 35 deaths in 2011 alone.
Reasons for the reduced number of piracy acts in 2012 are not clear. Some credit the expensive military intervention via patrols. Various countries have patrolled the Somali coast. However, the effectiveness of this strategy is not accepted by all. Captured pirates are often disarmed and released back to Somalia. Countries that have captured Somali pirates have not put them on trial. In response to naval patrols, pirates are also moving further from shore. Patrolling the Indian Ocean is a much less practical task. In any event, military patrols are very expensive and also raise the specter of geopolitical conflicts.
Nonetheless, the importance of maintaining the openness of strategic shipping lanes is widely accepted. Shipping lanes are critical to the worldwide economy. Finished goods and material resources, including oil, are routinely transported via ocean going ships. The interruption of strategic routes can have significant negative economic consequences in addition to the more readily measured loss to a given shipment. There is also a threat to human life, as piracy threatens the crew manning ships.
The threat also extends to other maritime assets. Large, medium and small vessels carry passengers upon the world's seas and are also at risk. The risk to a pleasure vessel includes the risk of theft, hostage taking, and human life. World energy companies have oil exploratory and pumping rigs situated around the world in a maritime setting. These assets are called gas and oil platforms. These platforms are under constant threat of attack, vandalism, and destruction in accordance with various geo-political motives.
In view of the risks, there is interest in protecting maritime assets. One option is armed guards. However, armed guards are not favored for many reasons. Crews are not skilled in the use of weapons and are not likely to be effective in their use. Adding highly trained personnel adds significant costs, and many cargo and passenger vessels have limited quarters to accommodate additional crew. In addition, many countries have strict customs laws that are extremely unforgiving in reference to the presence of weapons aboard vessels entering their territorial waters. Gas and oil platform working environments do not allow sufficient space for guards to be placed aboard the asset. Weapons are highly discouraged on gas and oil platforms to limit the risk of spark in a petroleum fume rich environment.
Maritime assets have also been equipped with monitoring systems to alert crews and allow crews to take other preventative measures. Crew activated prevent measures include a variety of devices, such as water hoses and non-lethal electric fencing. Many of these systems require crew involvement after being alerted to a threat by a monitoring system, and can also be defeated by determined assailants. In addition, many common land-based security systems are ineffective on maritime assets as sound and light based detection systems are complicated by the wind and water conditions that a sea vessel is subjected to when at sea.
Examples of systems requiring substantial crew involvement include a razor wire and smoke anti-boarding system developed by a company called Vessel Protection Systems. Canisters are hooked to the vessel's perimeter and each of the canister jettison 20 meters of razor wires which is swept aft by the speed of the ship to form a barrier, stretching from the main deck to the waterline. This large canisters of this system must be installed by crew when at sea and removed when in port, limiting the utility of the system. The reliance on vessel movement for deployment also limits the effectiveness of the system. Vessel Protection systems provides a separate solution for situations when vessels are at anchor or port. This solution is called the Climb Stopper. The Climb Stopper also is crew activated but does not rely on vessel's speed through the water for its effectiveness. The physical configuration is similar, but the uses large tanks of Oleoresin Capsicum (pepper spray) that each required a pair of electric pumps. The tanks cooperate with pipes that are permanently installed along the outside of the bulwarks at main deck level. When activated, the Climb Stoppers supply an overlapping spray to deter boarding.
One company, HPV Technologies has deployed a long throw planar magnetic speaker system referred to as the “MAD” speaker system. The device is a long-range audio device and magnetic acoustic device. It includes a long range communication mode in addition to a deterrence mode. After establishing intent with a detected vessel, crew can activate the deterrence mode of the device and direct it at potential intruders to produce a piercing tone that can irritate or disorientate the potential intruders. This system relies upon the crew for its activation and use. Some versions can be remotely controlled from the bridge to pan and tilt with the assistance of night vision cameras and lasers. It has been used in practice to deter pirates. However, like prior systems it assumes a permanent deck watch or other monitoring system.
Problems with crew involvement for activation include the fact that such systems are designed to activate once the intruder has already crossed the rail of the vessel—requiring the crew to play “catch up” to force protection. This scenario presents significant danger, as compliance is the only recourse for the crew's survival. In addition, the effectiveness of such systems is limited by the ability of the crew to detect threats. To make such systems effective, it is typical to employ additional, specialized crew. Attention must be devoted to radars, increased deck watches, and possibly embarked security teams.